

Program logics, fifth lecture

Some extensions of separation logic

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Waving the magic wand

Often, in a verification step, we want to apply

- a "small rule" $\{\ell \mapsto _{-}\} \operatorname{set}(\ell, v) \{\lambda_{-}, \ell \mapsto v\}$
- or a "small specification" for a function
 { *list*(w, p) } reverse(p) { λr. *list*(rev(w), r) }

in a bigger context, such as

$$list(p, w) * list(q, w') * \langle x > 0 \rangle * t \mapsto x * t + 1 \mapsto q$$

In general, we need to 1- unroll representation predicates, 2- find a framing, 3- apply the consequence rule.

(Derived from the frame rule + the consequence rule.)

A general ways to adapt what we already know $\{ P' \} c \{ Q' \}$ to what we need to prove $\{ P \} c \{ Q \}$.

$$\frac{\{P'\} c \{Q'\} \quad P \Rightarrow P' * R \quad \forall v, Q' v * R \Rightarrow Q v}{\{P\} c \{Q\}}$$

Automated or semi-automated theorem proving works well to show the implications $P \Rightarrow P' * R$ and $Q' v * R \Rightarrow Q v$.

The difficulty is to find assertion *R*.

The abduction problem

Given P and Q, find a minimal X such that $P * X \Rightarrow Q$.

(In other words: what does P lack in order to ensure Q?)

In general we cannot calculate a simple form for the solution *X*. But we can characterize it as follows:

$$X h = \forall h', h' \perp h \land P h' \Rightarrow Q(h' \uplus h)$$

This operation is written $P \rightarrow Q$, pronounced magic wand:

$$P \twoheadrightarrow Q \stackrel{def}{=} \lambda h. \forall h' \perp h, P h' \Rightarrow Q(h' \uplus h)$$

Magic wand = separating implication

Separating implication $\neg *$ is to separating conjunction * what plain implication \Rightarrow is to plain conjunction \land .

Adjunction property:

$$H \Rightarrow (P \twoheadrightarrow Q) \iff H \ast P \Rightarrow Q$$

Some other properties:

$$P * (P \rightarrow Q) \Rightarrow Q$$
 (elimination)

$$emp \Rightarrow P \rightarrow P$$
 (idempotence)

$$(P \rightarrow Q) * (Q \rightarrow R) \Rightarrow P \rightarrow R$$
 (transitivity)

$$(P * Q) \rightarrow R = P \rightarrow Q \rightarrow R$$
 (currying)

$$(P \rightarrow Q) * R \Rightarrow P \rightarrow (Q * R)$$
 (distribution)

$$\frac{\{P'\} c \{Q'\} \quad P \Rightarrow (P' \ast (\forall v, Q' v \twoheadrightarrow Q v))}{\{P\} c \{Q\}}$$

Like the framed consequence rule, but with a canonical choice for the "frame": $R = \forall v, Q' \ v \twoheadrightarrow Q \ v$

Replaces the problem of finding *R* with the problem of reasoning with formulas that use \rightarrow and *.

In separation logic, just like in Hoare logic, a command *c* with postcondition *Q* has a weakest precondition *wp c Q*, characterized by:

- It's a precondition: $\{ wp \ c \ Q \} c \{ Q \}$
- It's the weakest: if $\{P\} c \{Q\}$ then $P \Rightarrow wp c Q$

We can define wp c Q in two ways:

from the operational semantics: $wp \ c \ Q = \lambda h$. Term $c \ h \ Q$ (or Safe)from the triples: $wp \ c \ Q = \exists P. \ P * \langle \{P\} \ c \ \{Q\} \rangle$

An equivalence with triples:

```
\{P\} c \{Q\} if and only if P \Rightarrow wp c Q
```

A view of deductive verification as a calculation, directed by the syntax of the command *c*:

"Given a command *c* and the specification *Q* of its results, what precondition should the initial state satisfy so that *c* executes without errors and the final state satisfies *Q*?"

The rules of separation logic can be rephrased using wp:

$Q \llbracket a \rrbracket \Rightarrow wp \ a \ Q$ $wp \ c \ (\lambda v. wp \ c'[x \leftarrow v] \ Q) \Rightarrow wp \ (let \ x = c \ in \ c') \ Q$ $(if \llbracket b \rrbracket then \ wp \ c_1 \ Q \ else \ wp \ c_2 \ Q) \Rightarrow wp \ (if \ b \ then \ c_1 \ else \ c_2) \ Q$

For the imperative constructs, the "small rules" lead to *wp* equations that are unusable, because they work only for postconditions *Q* of a very specific shape.

$$\begin{array}{rcl} & \operatorname{emp} & \Rightarrow & wp \ (\operatorname{alloc}(N)) \ (\lambda \ell. \ \ell \mapsto _ \ast \cdots \ast \ell + N - 1 \mapsto _) \\ & \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x & \Rightarrow & wp \ (\operatorname{get}(a)) \ (\lambda v. \ \langle v = x \rangle \ast \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x) \\ & \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _ & \Rightarrow & wp \ (\operatorname{set}(a, a')) \ (\lambda v. \ \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto \llbracket a' \rrbracket) \\ & \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _ & \Rightarrow & wp \ (\operatorname{set}(a, a')) \ (\lambda v. \ \operatorname{emp}) \end{array}$$

Time to wave the magic wand...

The frame rule:

$$(wp \ c \ Q) * R \Rightarrow wp \ c \ (\lambda v. \ Q \ v * R)$$

The consequence rule:

 $\forall v, Q v \Rightarrow Q' v$

wp c $Q \Rightarrow$ wp c Q'

The ramified consequence rule:

 $wp \ c \ Q \ \bigstar \ (\forall v, \ Q \ v \ \twoheadrightarrow \ Q' \ v) \Rightarrow wp \ c \ Q'$

Applying ramification to the *wp* calculation for imperative constructs, we obtain *wp* equations usable for any postcondition *Q*.

$$\forall \ell, \ (\ell \mapsto _ \ast \cdots \ast \ell + N - 1 \mapsto _) \twoheadrightarrow Q \ \ell \ \Rightarrow \ wp \ (\texttt{alloc}(N)) \ Q \\ \exists x, \ \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x \ast (\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x \twoheadrightarrow Q \ x) \ \Rightarrow \ wp \ (\texttt{get}(a)) \ Q \\ \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _ \ast (\forall v, \ \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto \llbracket a' \rrbracket \twoheadrightarrow Q \ v) \ \Rightarrow \ wp \ (\texttt{get}(a)) \ Q \\ (\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _) \ast (\forall v, Q \ v) \ \Rightarrow \ wp \ (\texttt{set}(a, a')) \ Q \\ (\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _) \ast (\forall v, Q \ v) \ \Rightarrow \ wp \ (\texttt{free}(a)) \ Q$$

A taste of the "Iris proof mode"

In proof assistants such as Coq, we prefer to work with proof contexts

$$x_1 \ldots x_n H_1 \ldots H_m$$

Р

instead of formulas $\forall x_1, \ldots x_n, H_1 \land \cdots \land H_m \Rightarrow P$.

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A proof context in separation logic is:

 $\frac{X_1 \dots X_n \ H_1 \dots H_m}{Q}$ (standard hypotheses) $\frac{P_1 \dots P_k}{Q}$ (goal)

It stands for $\forall x_i, H_1 \land \cdots \land H_m \Rightarrow P_1 * \cdots * P_k \Rightarrow Q$.


Some introduction rules

	\rightsquigarrow	P ₁ P _n	
$P_1 * \cdots * P_n \twoheadrightarrow Q$		Q	
		Н	
$\ldots \langle H \rangle$	$\sim \rightarrow$		
		X	
∃x, P x	\rightsquigarrow	P x	

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wp $c Q \approx$ "we do c, then we will have Q".

The postcondition *Q* plays the role of a continuation, memorizing what comes next during execution.



Symbolic execution of memory operations

The wp rules for the memory operations become clearer:

 $\exists x, \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x \star (\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x \twoheadrightarrow Q x) \Rightarrow wp (get(a)) Q$

$\begin{tabular}{cccc} \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x & \dots \\ \hline wp \ (\texttt{get}(a)) \ Q \end{tabular}$	\rightsquigarrow	$\frac{\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto x \dots}{Q x}$
$\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _ \star (\forall v, \llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto \llbracket a' \rrbracket \twoheadrightarrow$	$\langle Q v \rangle \Rightarrow w_{p}$	
$\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _ \dots$	\rightsquigarrow	$\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto \llbracket a' \rrbracket \dots$
wp (set(a,a')) Q		Qv

 $\forall \ell, \ (\ell \mapsto _ \ast \cdots \ast \ell + N - 1 \mapsto _) \twoheadrightarrow Q \ \ell \Rightarrow wp \ (\texttt{alloc}(N)) \ Q$ $\cdots \qquad \ell$ $\cdots \qquad \ell$ $wp \ (\texttt{alloc}(N)) \ Q \qquad Q \ \ell$

 $(\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _) \bigstar (\forall v, Q \ v) \Rightarrow wp \ (\texttt{free}(a)) \ Q$

		V
$\llbracket a \rrbracket \mapsto _ \ldots$	\rightsquigarrow	
wp(free(a))Q		Qv

Partial permissions

Several processes access a shared data structure without synchronization, but do not modify the data structure.

$$x := \ldots T[i] \ldots \parallel y := \ldots T[i] \ldots \parallel z := \ldots T[i] \ldots$$

This is safe:

- No race conditions (two simultaneous reads from the same location produce a well-defined result).
- Cf. the Rust motto: "shared xor mutable".

Several processes access a shared data structure without synchronization, but do not modify the data structure.

$$x := \ldots T[i] \ldots \parallel y := \ldots T[i] \ldots \parallel z := \ldots T[i] \ldots$$

This is efficient:

No need to copy the data structure in each process.
 (≠ distributed-memory parallelism).

Several processes access a shared data structure without synchronization, but do not modify the data structure.

$$x := \ldots T[i] \ldots \parallel y := \ldots T[i] \ldots \parallel z := \ldots T[i] \ldots$$

This cannot be expressed in basic separation logic!

 Outside a critical section or atomic section, a memory location is accessible (for reads and for writes) by only one process.

$$\{P_1\} c_1 \{\lambda_{-}, Q_1\} \{P_2\} c_2 \{\lambda_{-}, Q_2\}$$

 $\{P_1 \bigstar P_2\} c_1 \parallel c_2 \{\lambda_{-}, Q_1 \bigstar Q_2\}$

• Cf. the "no race conditions" theorem in lecture #4.

The assertion $\ell \mapsto v$, "location ℓ contains value v", can also be read as a permission to access location ℓ for reading, writing, or freeing.

Naive idea: distinguish two permissions

Full permission: $\ell \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} V$ (read, write, free)Read-only permission: $\ell \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} V$ (read)

A permission model

The "small rule" for get accepts both permissions. The other small rules produce or require full permissions.

$$\{ \operatorname{emp} \} \quad \operatorname{alloc}(N) \quad \{ \lambda \ell. \ \ell \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} _ \ast \cdots \ast \ell + N - 1 \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} _ \}$$

$$\{ \llbracket a \rrbracket \stackrel{\pi}{\mapsto} x \} \quad \operatorname{get}(a) \quad \{ \lambda v. \ \langle v = x \rangle \ast \llbracket a \rrbracket \stackrel{\pi}{\mapsto} x \} \quad (\pi \in \{1, R\})$$

$$\{ \llbracket a \rrbracket \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} _ \} \quad \operatorname{set}(a, a') \quad \{ \lambda v. \llbracket a \rrbracket \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} \llbracket a' \rrbracket \}$$

$$\{ \llbracket a \rrbracket \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} _ \} \quad \operatorname{free}(a) \quad \{ \lambda v. \operatorname{emp} \}$$

A full permission can be weakened:

$$\ell \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} V \; \Rightarrow \; \ell \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} V$$

A read-only permission can be duplicated:

$$\ell \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} \mathbf{v} = \ell \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} \mathbf{v} \star \ell \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} \mathbf{v}$$

Example of read-only sharing

$$\begin{array}{c|c} \operatorname{let} t = \operatorname{alloc}(1) \text{ in} \\ & \operatorname{set}(t, f(x)); \\ \{t \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} f(x)\} \Rightarrow \{t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x)\} \Rightarrow \{t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x)\} \\ \\ \{t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x)\} \\ & \ldots \operatorname{get}(t) \ldots \\ & \ldots \\ \{t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_1\} \end{array} \quad \begin{cases} t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_2 \\ \\ \{t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_2 \end{cases}$$

 $\{t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_1 * Q_2\}$

Example of read-only sharing

$$\begin{aligned} & | \text{tt} t = \text{alloc}(1) \text{ in} \\ & \text{set}(t, f(x)); \\ & \{ t \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} f(x) \} \Rightarrow \{ t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) \} \Rightarrow \{ t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) \} \\ & \{ t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) \} \\ & \dots \text{get}(t) \dots \\ & \dots \\ & \{ t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_1 \} \end{aligned} \qquad \begin{cases} t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_2 \} \\ & \{ t \stackrel{R}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_1 \} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Problem: we cannot free *t* at the end of this code!

$$\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} = 1$$

Boyland (2003): permissions π are rational numbers in (0, 1].

- $\pi = 1$: full permission.
- $0 < \pi < 1$: read-only permission.

The law for splitting and recombining permissions:

$$\ell \stackrel{\pi+\pi'}{\longmapsto} \mathbf{v} = \ell \stackrel{\pi}{\mapsto} \mathbf{v} \star \ell \stackrel{\pi'}{\mapsto} \mathbf{v} \quad \text{if } \pi + \pi' \in (0, 1]$$

Read-only sharing using fractional permissions

 $\begin{aligned} & | \texttt{tt} t = \texttt{alloc}(1) \texttt{ in } \\ & \texttt{set}(t, f(x)); \\ & \{ t \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} f(x) \} \Rightarrow \{ t \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} f(x) * t \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} f(x) \} \\ & \{ t \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} f(x) \} \\ & \dots \texttt{get}(t) \dots \\ & \dots \\ & \{ t \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_1 \} \end{aligned} \qquad \begin{cases} t \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} f(x) * Q_2 \} \end{aligned}$

 $\{ t \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} f(x) \ast t \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} f(x) \ast Q_1 \ast Q_2 \} \Rightarrow \{ t \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} f(x) \ast Q_1 \ast Q_2 \}$ free(t) $\{ Q_1 \ast Q_2 \}$ A set Π equipped with a partial operation \oplus to combine two permissions. The operation is

commutative $\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2 = \pi_2 \oplus \pi_1$ and associative $(\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2) \oplus \pi_3 = \pi_1 \oplus (\pi_2 \oplus \pi_3).$

Note: read $\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2 = \pi$ as "the combination $\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2$ is defined and equal to π ".

A heap *h* is a finite function from locations to pairs (π, v) of a permission and a value.

We define the combination of two such pairs as:

$$(\pi_1, v_1) \oplus (\pi_2, v_2) = (\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2, v_1)$$
 if $v_1 = v_2$ and $\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2$ is defined

The combination $h_1 \oplus h_2$ of two heaps is defined if

 $h_1 \perp h_2 \stackrel{def}{=} \forall \ell \in Dom(h_1) \cap Dom(h_2), h_1(\ell) \oplus h_2(\ell) \text{ is defined}$

The combination is defined by

$$\mathsf{Dom}(h_1 \oplus h_2) = \mathsf{Dom}(h_1) \cup \mathsf{Dom}(h_2)$$

 $(h_1 \oplus h_2)(\ell) = egin{cases} h_1(\ell) \oplus h_2(\ell) & ext{if } \ell \in \mathsf{Dom}(h_1) \cap \mathsf{Dom}(h_2) \ h_1(\ell) & ext{if } \ell \in \mathsf{Dom}(h_1) \setminus \mathsf{Dom}(h_2) \ h_2(\ell) & ext{if } \ell \in \mathsf{Dom}(h_2) \setminus \mathsf{Dom}(h_1) \end{cases}$

Generalizes the notion of disjoint union $h_1 \uplus h_2$.

The usual definitions, using heap combination \oplus instead of disjoint union $\uplus.$

$$P * Q = \lambda h. \exists h_1, h_2, h = h_1 \oplus h_2 \land P h_1 \land Q h_2$$
$$P * Q = \lambda h. \exists h_1, h_2, h_2 = h \oplus h_1 \land P h_1 \land Q h_2$$

In particular, $\ell \stackrel{\pi_1}{\mapsto} v_1 \star \ell \stackrel{\pi_2}{\mapsto} v_2$ holds if and only if $\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2$ is defined, $v_1 = v_2$, and $\ell \stackrel{\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2}{\longmapsto} v_1$.

Passivity

An interesting property: every command c provable with a precondition "read-only permission on location ℓ " cannot modify ℓ .

Proof sketch in the sequential case:

By way of contradiction, assume $\{ \ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} v \} c \{ \lambda_{-}, \ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} v' \}$ with $v' \neq v$.

By framing with $\ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} v$, we get

$$\{\ell \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} \mathsf{v}\}\mathsf{c}\{\lambda_{-},\ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} \mathsf{v}' \bigstar \ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} \mathsf{v}\}$$

The precondition is true, but the postcondition is always false, since location ℓ cannot contain both v and v'.

In the presence of atomic sections or critical sections, the passivity property is less clear-cut.

Indeed, if the shared-memory invariant gives us the missing permission $\ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto}$, we can derive

$$\ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} _ \vdash \{ \ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} \mathsf{v} \} \texttt{atomic}(\texttt{set}(\ell, \mathsf{v}')) \{ \lambda_{_}, \ell \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} \mathsf{v}' \}$$

even if $v' \neq v$.

Another permission schema, better suited to programs using readers-writer locks.

Permissions π are integers ≥ -1 :

- 0: full permission (get, set, alloc, free)
- -1: read-only permission (get)
- n > 0: number of read-only permissions that were granted.

We have:

$$\ell \stackrel{n}{\mapsto} \mathbf{v} = \ell \stackrel{n+1}{\longmapsto} \mathbf{v} \star \ell \stackrel{-1}{\longmapsto} \mathbf{v} \quad \text{if } n \ge 0$$

One writer, several readers

	Readers	Writer	
$\{ emp \}$	P(read);		
	count := count + 1;		
	<pre>if count = 1 then P(write);</pre>		$\{ \texttt{emp}\}$
	V(read);	P(write);	
$\{ b \stackrel{-1}{\mapsto} _ \}$			$\set{b \stackrel{0}{\mapsto} _}$
	read b	write b	
$\set{b \stackrel{-1}{\mapsto}_{-}}$			$\set{b \stackrel{0}{\mapsto} _}$
	P(read);	V(write);	
	count := count - 1;		$\{ \tt emp \}$
	if count = 0 then V(write);		
{ emp }	V(read);		
(omb)			

Invariant for *write*: $b \stackrel{0}{\mapsto} _$ Invariant for *read*: $\exists n, \ count \stackrel{0}{\mapsto} n * (\langle n = 0 \rangle \lor \langle n > 0 \rangle * b \stackrel{n}{\mapsto} _)$

Ghost code

Two ways to facilitate writing specifications as Hoare triples.

Auxiliary variables: mathematical variables α, β, \ldots universally quantified before the triple.

 $\forall \alpha, \beta, \ \{ \, \mathtt{x} = \alpha \land \mathtt{y} = \beta \, \} \, \mathtt{if} \, \mathtt{x} < \mathtt{y} \, \mathtt{then} \, \mathtt{x} := \mathtt{y} \, \{ \, \mathtt{x} = \max(\alpha, \beta) \, \}$

Ghost variables: variables from the programming language that do not appear in the program.

$$\{z = x\}$$
 if $x < y$ then $x := y \{x = max(z, y)\}$

To make verification easier, we can add ghost code: commands that modify ghost variables but have no effects on program variables.

This ghost code can be removed before execution, since normal (non-ghost) code does not depend on ghost variables.

Example: remainder of Euclidean division

$$\{ u \ge 0 \}$$

$$r := a;$$
while $r \ge b$ do
$$\{ r \ge 0 \land \exists q, a = b \cdot q + r \}$$

$$r := r - b$$
done
$$\{ r = a \mod b \}$$

(- > 0)

Automated theorem provers sometimes have a hard time with existential quantification...

Example: remainder of Euclidean division

```
\{a \ge 0\}
r := a;
(a \ge 0;)
while r \ge b do
\{r \ge 0 \land a = b \cdot q + r\}
(a \ge 0;)
(a \ge 0;)
\{r \ge 0 \land a = b \cdot q + r\}
(a \ge 0;)
((a \ge 0;))
(((a \ge 0;))
(((a \ge 0;)))
(((a \ge 0;))
((((a \ge 0;)))
(((((a \ge 0;))
```

The ghost code computes the appropriate value for *q*. The theorem prover only has to check this value.

Like in lecture #3: mark all nodes reachable from the root r.

```
def DFS r =
if MARK[r] = 0 then begin
MARK[r] := 1;
for i = 0 to ARITY[r] - 1 do DFS(CHILD[r][i]) done
end
```

It is surprisingly hard to prove this code correct!

We reintroduce the worklist W as a ghost variable. ($W \approx$ the nodes that remain to be traversed)

```
def DFSREC p =
   \bigcirc W := W \setminus \{p\}; 
  if MARK[p] = 0 then begin
     MARK[p] := 1;
      \widehat{} W := W \cup \{ CHILD[p][i] \mid 0 < i < ARITY[p] \}; 
     for i = 0 to ARITY[p] - 1 do DFS (CHILD[p][i]) done
  end
def DFS r =
   \bigcirc W := \{r\}; 
  DESREC r
```

We can then show the invariant

 $\forall x, path(r, x) \iff MARK[x] = 1 \lor \exists p \in W, path(p, x)$

and conclude

 $\{ \forall x, \texttt{MARK}[x] = 0 \} \text{ DFS } r \{ \forall x, path(r, x) \iff \texttt{MARK}[x] = 1 \}$

Note: ghost code is not always executable, and ghost variables can be of a type that is not expressible in the programming language! Here, we used mathematical sets for *W*. In a concurrent program, we can use ghost code and ghost variables to keep track of the actions of each process.

Example: producer/consumer.

 $\begin{array}{c|c} \bigcap PR := \varepsilon; CO := \varepsilon; \\ \mbox{while true do} \\ \mbox{compute } x; \\ \bigcap PR := PR \cdot x \\ \mbox{produce}(x); \\ \mbox{done} \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c|c} \mbox{while true do} \\ \mbox{let } y = \mbox{consume}() \mbox{in} \\ \bigcap CO := \mbox{CO} \cdot y \\ \mbox{use } y \\ \mbox{done} \end{array}$

The ghost lists *PR* and *CO* keep track of the data produced or consumed.

set(n, 0);atomic(incr(n)) || atomic(incr(n))

With
$$incr(p) \stackrel{def}{=} \texttt{let} x = \texttt{get}(p) \texttt{ in } \texttt{set}(p, x+1).$$

In the previous lecture, we saw how to prove the safety of this code and the fact that $n \ge 0$ at the end, using the resource invariant $J = \exists x, n \mapsto x * \langle x \ge 0 \rangle$.

But how can we prove full correctness? that is, n = 2 at the end?

 $\mathtt{set}(n,0);$ $\mathtt{set}(a,0);$ $\mathtt{set}(b,0);$

 $atomic(incr(n); \ (ncr(a))) \| atomic(incr(n); \ (ncr(b)))$

a represents the contribution of the left process to the sum *n*, *b* represents that of the right process.

 $\mathtt{set}(n,0);$ $\textcircled{n} \mathtt{set}(a,0); \mathtt{set}(b,0);$

 $atomic(incr(n); \bigcap incr(a)) \parallel atomic(incr(n); \bigcap incr(b))$

a represents the contribution of the left process to the sum *n*, *b* represents that of the right process.

We would like to reflect this in the invariant:

 $\exists x, y, a \mapsto x * b \mapsto y * n \mapsto x + y.$

But this requires *a* and *b* to belong to the shared state.

We would like to show $a \mapsto 1$ and $b \mapsto 1$ at the end. But this requires that a belongs to the left process and b to the right process. Consider the resource invariant

$$J = \exists x, y, a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} x * b \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} y * n \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} x + y$$

We have:

$$\{J * a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} x\} \Rightarrow$$

$$\{a \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} x * \exists y, b \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} y * n \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} x + y\}$$
incr(n);
incr(a);
$$\{a \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} x + 1 * \exists y, b \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} y * n \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} x + 1 + y\}$$

$$\Rightarrow \{J * a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} x + 1\}$$

Therefore, $J \vdash \{ a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} x \} \operatorname{atomic}(incr(n); incr(a)) \{ a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} x + 1 \}$

We can then derive:

$$set(n,0); set(a,0); set(b,0);$$

$$\{n \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 0 \ast a \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 0 \ast b \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 0\} \Rightarrow \{J \ast a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 0 \ast b \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 0\}$$

$$\{a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 0\}$$

$$atomic(incr(n); incr(a))$$

$$\{a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 1\}$$

$$\{J \ast a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 1 \ast b \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 1\} \Rightarrow \{n \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 2 \ast a \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 1 \ast b \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 1\}$$

Therefore, n = 2 in the end!

We can then derive:

$$set(n,0); set(a,0); set(b,0);$$

$$\{n \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 0 \ast a \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 0 \ast b \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 0\} \Rightarrow \{J \ast a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 0 \ast b \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 0\}$$

$$\{a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 0\}$$

$$atomic(incr(n); incr(a))$$

$$\{a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 1\}$$

$$\{J \ast a \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 1 \ast b \stackrel{1/2}{\mapsto} 1\} \Rightarrow \{n \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 2 \ast a \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 1 \ast b \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} 1\}$$

Therefore, n = 2 in the end!

This is an elementary example of a very general technique: protocols governing the evolutions of ghost states

ightarrow seminar #5 by J. H. Jourdan.

Storable locks

Two kinds of mutual exclusion:

• Coarse-grained: a (global) lock protects the whole data structure.

Described well by the resource model of O'Hearn's concurrent separation logic.

• Fine-grained: one lock per memory block comprised in the data structure.

Need to reason about locks that are stored in memory, inside the block that they protect against simultaneous accesses.


By locking nodes one after the other, we can operate over the list in parallel.



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Locking one node at a time is not enough! Example: one process removes "3", the other removes "4".

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
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Example: one process removes "2", the other removes "5".



Locking one node at a time is not enough! Example: one process removes "3", the other removes "4". The result can be [1; 2; 4; 5; 6] instead of [1; 2; 5; 6].















Two new assertions:

- $\ell \stackrel{\pi}{\longrightarrow} RI$ "at location ℓ , with permission π , there is a lock that protects the resource described by RI"

The "small rules" for locks:

 $\{\ell \stackrel{\pi}{\to} RI\} \quad \operatorname{lock}(\ell) \quad \{\ell \stackrel{\pi}{\to} RI * \stackrel{\bullet}{\bullet} \ell * RI\}$ $\{\ell \stackrel{\pi}{\to} RI * \stackrel{\bullet}{\bullet} \ell * RI\} \quad \operatorname{unlock}(\ell) \quad \{\ell \stackrel{\pi}{\to} RI\}$ $\{\ell \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} _{-} * RI\} \quad \operatorname{initlock}(\ell) \quad \{\ell \stackrel{1}{\to} RI\}$ $\{\ell \stackrel{\bullet}{\to} RI\} \quad \operatorname{destroylock}(\ell) \quad \{\ell \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} _{-} * RI\}$

Representation predicate for sorted lists

(Following Gotsman, Berdine, Cook, Rinetzky and Sagiv, 2007.

See Jacobs and Piessens, 2011, for a more fine-grained specification.)

We add a sentinel $-\infty$ at the beginning and another $+\infty$ at end.

$$\begin{split} list(p,n) &= (\langle n = +\infty \rangle * p.\text{val} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} n * p.\text{next} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} \text{NULL}) \\ &\vee (\exists q,n', \ \langle n < n' \rangle * p.\text{val} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} n * p.\text{next} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} q \\ &\quad * p.\text{lock} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} list(q,n')) \\ listhead(p,\pi) &= \exists q,n, \ p.\text{val} \stackrel{\pi}{\mapsto} -\infty * p.\text{next} \stackrel{\pi}{\mapsto} q \end{split}$$

* $p.lock \stackrel{\pi}{\rightarrow} list(q, n)$

The head of the list (the $-\infty$ sentinel) is shared (π < 1). The other list nodes are in exclusive access mode, protected by the lock contained in the previous node.


Summary

We have seen a few extensions to separation logic, both sequential and concurrent.

Many other extensions have been studied in the last 20 years:

- "first-class X" for various values of X: functions, Hoare triples, process ID, ...
- Modular reasoning: for instance, interactions between an arbitrary number of processes, not just 2.
- Verification of advanced concurrent algorithms: optimistic locking, lock-free algorithms, etc.

A proliferation of program logics



(Diagram by Ilya Sergey)

- + Purely logical facts $\langle {\it P} \rangle$
- Facts about variables $\mathbf{x} = \alpha$ (in Hoare logic)
- Facts about the memory heap emp, $\ell\mapsto$ v, $\ell\mapsto$ _
- The same plus permissions $\ell \stackrel{\pi}{\mapsto} \mathbf{v}$
- Facts about locks $\ell \stackrel{\pi}{\bullet} RI$, $\square \ell$
- Facts about ghost states.
- Time credits
- Transition systems
- What else?

- (ightarrow seminar by F. Pottier)
- (ightarrow seminar by J. H. Jourdan)

1- Resource algebras, previously called *partial commutative monoids*.

(An operation \oplus commutative, associative, partial, representing the combination of two compatible "things".)

2- Ghost transitions, generalizing ghost code.

3- Invariants, generalizing the various kinds of resource invariants previously mentioned.

4- A systematic use of step indexing and the "later" modality (▷) to work around circular definitions of higher-order notions.

References

All about Iris:

- J.-H. Jourdan's seminar (#6).
- Papers, tutorials, Coq development: https://iris-project.org/

Partial permissions:

• R. Bornat, C. Calcagno, P. O'Hearn, M. Parkinson, *Permission* accounting in separation logic, POPL 2005.

Storable locks:

• A. Gotsman, J. Berdine, B. Cook, N. Rinetzky, M. Sagiv, *Local reasoning for storable locks and threads*, APLAS 2007.